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ABSTRACT 
Machine learning based system are increasingly being used for 
sensitive tasks such as security surveillance, guiding autonomous 
vehicle, taking investment decisions, detecting and blocking 
network intrusion and malware etc. However, recent research has 
shown that machine learning models are venerable to attacks by 
adversaries at all phases of machine learning (e.g., training data 
collection, training, operation). All model classes of machine 
learning systems can be misled by providing carefully crafted 
inputs making them wrongly classify inputs. Maliciously created 
input samples can affect the learning process of a ML system by 
either slowing the learning process, or affecting the performance of 
the learned model or causing the system make error only in 
attacker’s planned scenario.  Because of these developments, 
understanding security of machine learning algorithms and systems 
is emerging as an important research area among computer security 
and machine learning researchers and practitioners. We present a 
survey of this emerging area. 
Categories and Subject Descriptors 
D.4.6 [Security and Protection]: Invasive software; I.2.6 
[Learning]: Concept learning; I.5.1 [Models]: Neural nets; I.5.2 
[Design Methodology]:  Classifier design and evaluation. 
General Terms 
Algorithms, Design, Security, Theory. 
Keywords 
Resilience, Adversarial Learning, Computer Security, Intrusion 
Detection. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Over last few years, machine leaning has become a prominent 
technological tool in several application areas such as computer 
vision, speech recognition, natural language understanding, 
recommender systems, information retrieval, computer gaming, 
medical diagnosis, market analysis etc. In many areas, it is no 
longer a promising but immature technology as machine learning 
based systems have reached close to human level performance. 
Most of machine learning techniques build models using example 
data (training data). These models along with algorithms can be 
used to make predictions on data not seen before. 
Learning and building models using training data provides hackers 
opportunities to attack machine learning algorithms by playing with 
the features and decision boundaries of the model. An adversary 
can craft malicious inputs to attack the performance or efficiency 
of a machine learning algorithm. Some systems where data 
distribution is not fully known at training time, use data examples 
in future to continuously train the system to adjust for the changing 
data distribution. An adversary can contribute malicious inputs to 
‘poison’ the system. Others can dupe an already trained system by 
creating input data that exploits the system into making glaring 
errors. 
 
Figure 1: Creating adversarial example using noise 
(Image credit: Szegedy et al. [1]) 
For example, researchers have demonstrated [1], how to fool an 
image classification system by making tiny changes to the input 
images. Figure 1 shows three images. On the left is an image that 
the system correctly classifies as a school bus. Image in center is a 
noise which when added to the left image creates an image shown 
on the right which still looks like a school bus to a human observer. 
But the system now classifies this image (right) as an ostrich. These 
techniques can be used by hackers to evade the system in making it 
accept malicious content as a genuine one. With machine learning 
becoming an important tool in strategically important applications 
such as security surveillance and background check for visa 
decisions etc., it is important to understand these attacks and make 
machine learning algorithms more robust against these attacks. 
If a hacker does not already know the algorithm, he first tries to 
learn the algorithm and its underlying model (e.g., logistic 
regression, neural network, decision trees etc.). Sometime, the 
hacker may only be interested in learning the model so that he can 
build his own ‘copy’ of the system using the learned model. This 
may be useful if the application is offered as a service via APIs and 
users are charged per use of these APIs. A hacker can create a 
sequence of inputs and then by observing outputs of the system 
corresponding these inputs, he can build a local model that may be 
very close to the model used by the original system. Depending on 
the pricing and the license terms of the API usage, a hacker may be 
able to ‘steal’ the model using very small amount of money. Tramer 
et al demonstrated at USENIX Security Symposium 2016 [2] that 
models can be extracted from popular online machine learning 
services such as BigML and Amazon Machine Learning with a 
relatively small number of API calls. 
Another category of attacks on machine learning systems is to 
provide adversarial input during the training phase and compromise 
the learning by affecting its efficiency or introducing some bias. 
Many systems allow users to provide training data samples for 
online training of the system. Collecting training data from people 
spared across geographies is immensely valuable in many 
applications to have good data distribution. But opening the system 
to public for providing input data also opens a system to malicious 
input created by hackers to ‘poison’ the system. Microsoft’s twitter 
chatbot Tay started tweeting racist and sexist tweets in less than 24 
hours after it was opened to public for learning [3]. 
This survey categorizes major works in Adversarial Machine 
Learning area in three broad categories. First set consists of 
research focusing on learning algorithms and its models by 
providing carefully crafted inputs and then observing the output to 
build local copies of the models. Second set consists of techniques 
focusing on evasion attacks. And the third set combines the work 
focusing on poisoning attacks. These are not disjoint sets and many 
of the works overlaps across these categories. 
Rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we discuss 
some earlier work on creating adversarial input to attack 
classification systems such as spam filters and anti-virus/malware 
systems. Section 3 discusses exploratory attacks that aim to learn 
algorithms and models of machine learning systems under attack. 
Section 4 discusses work related to evasion attacks. Section 5 
discusses work covering poisoning attacks. Section 6 provides a 
summary in a table. Section 7 concludes the survey with a 
discussion on trends and research directions in this area. Appendix-
A lists libraries and other open source software/data-repositories 
useful for Adversarial Machine Learning research. 
2. EARLIER RELATED WORK 
Some early work in attacking learning algorithms with malicious 
input come from anti-spam filters, anti-malware and biometric 
verification domains. A classifier is designed that works on input 
samples. It automatically determines whether a sample falls into a 
malicious target class (e.g., spam email or malware/worm) or a 
safe/genuine class. The classifier is typically generated 
automatically using learning by analyzing labeled training samples. 
Data mining algorithms normally assume that data gathering 
activities are independent of data mining algorithms. However, an 
adversary manipulates data actively such that many false negatives 
are produced. 
Dalvi et al [4] proposed a game theory based approach to design 
classifiers. The classification process is viewed as a game between 
classifier and adversary. An optimal classifier is produced for 
adversary’s optimal strategy. The classifier thus automatically 
adjusts to adversary's evolving inputs. Their experiments with spam 
filtering show that such classifiers outperform standard classifiers. 
Bruckner and Scheffer [5, 6, 7] proposed single-shot prediction 
games in which the cost functions of classifier and adversary are 
not necessarily completely opposed to each other. They identified 
conditions such that a prediction game achieves a unique Nash 
equilibrium. They proposed techniques to develop algorithms that 
find the equilibrial prediction models. These techniques work well 
in email spam filtering. 
Often, it is assumed that adversaries have good knowledge of 
classifiers which may be unrealistic. Lowd and Meek [8] defined 
an adversarial classifier reverse engineering (ACRE) learning 
problem. Without any knowledge of a classifier, the task is to learn 
enough about it to construct adversarial attacks. Their algorithms 
targeted liner classifiers with either continuous or Boolean features 
and used spam filter data to demonstrate effectiveness. 
Barreno et al [9] provided a taxonomy of different types of attacks 
on machine learning algorithms and an analytical model giving a 
lower bound on attacker's work function. Proposed taxonomy puts 
attack models in three major categories – influence, specificity and 
security violation. Influence attacks are further divided into two 
sub-categories – causative attacks change the training process by 
having some control over the training data; and exploratory attacks 
try to discover information using some probes. Under specificity 
attacks, targeted attacks are those that only focus their attack on a 
specific point or a small set of points; whereas indiscriminate 
attacks are those where attackers are flexible and involve some 
general class of points (e.g., any false negative). Security violation 
attacks include integrity attacks where intrusion points are made to 
be classified as normal; availability attacks are broader than 
integrity attack. They aim to cause many classification errors (both 
false negatives and false positives) so that system effectively 
becomes unusable. 
In anti-malware/virus software and network security domains, 
signature detection approaches are widely used. To evade 
signature-based intrusion detection systems, attackers employ 
polymorphic techniques to generate attack instances that do not 
share fixed signatures. Anomaly detection is used to guard against 
such attacks because even though attackers can use polymorphic 
techniques to make attack instances look different from each other, 
they cannot make them look normal. Fogla et el [10] proposed a 
new class of polymorphic attacks, called polymorphic blending 
attacks (a sub class of mimicry attacks). These attacks can evade 
byte-frequency based network anomaly intrusion detection systems 
by matching the statistics of mutated attack samples with normal 
samples. Newsome et al [11] designed practical attacks against 
learning and used them on automatic polymorphic worm signature 
generation algorithms effectively. In their approach, an adversary 
builds labeled samples. Training with these samples prevent or 
severely delay generation of good classifiers. They show that a 
delusive adversary can obstruct learning whose samples are all 
otherwise correctly labeled. 
In view of attacks on learning based classifiers, it is desirable to 
make these classifiers robust against such attacks. One obvious 
thing is to not assign too much weight to a single feature to increase 
robustness of a classifier. Regularization is used to spread the 
weight more evenly between the features. However, regularization 
is a very generic technique and may not be suitable to specific 
classification tasks.  Globerson and Roweis [12] introduced an 
algorithm to avoid single feature over-weighting by analyzing 
robustness using a game theoretic formalization. These classifiers 
are optimally resilient to deletion of features in a minimax sense. 
They constructed such classifiers using quadratic programming. 
These classifiers were tested in spam filtering and handwritten digit 
recognition tasks. Kolcz and Teo [13] introduced a new method to 
find the lower bound of classifier robustness. Simple averaged 
classifiers can improve robustness considerably. They also 
proposed a feature reweighting algorithm to improve robustness 
and performance of classifiers. Biggio et al [14] experimentally 
investigate whether the technique proposed in [13] can be 
implemented using bagging [15] and random subspace method 
(RSM) [16] – two well-known techniques for multiple classifier 
construction. 
In applications such as biometric verification and authentication, 
characteristics used are assumed to meet some basic requirements 
such as universality, distinctiveness, permanence, etc. But in 
practice, no biometric trait fully meets these requisites which means 
no single biometric mode is error free. Multiple biometric 
modalities are used to minimize these errors. Rodrigues et al [17] 
proposed two fusion schemes that aim to increase the robustness of 
multimodal biometric systems. First is a likelihood ratio based 
fusion scheme and the other is based on fuzzy logic. In addition to 
matching score and sample quality score, the proposed fusion 
schemes also considers intrinsic security of different biometric 
system being used. They demonstrate that these methods are more 
robust against spoof attacks than traditional fusion methods. 
3. EXPLORATORY ATTACKS 
Exploratory attacks do not attempt to influence training; instead 
they try to discover information from the learner that includes 
discovering which machine learning algorithm/technique is being 
used by the system, state of the underlying model and training data. 
3.1 Model Inversion 
Fredrikson et al introduced the term model inversion in [18]. In 
pharmacogenetics, machine learning techniques are used to assist 
in medical treatments based on patient’s genotype and other 
background. Maintaining privacy about patients’ personal and 
medical records is an important requirement in healthcare domain 
and mandated by law in many nations. Fredrikson et al showed that 
by using the model (black box access) and some demographic 
information about a patient, an attacker can predict the patient’s 
genetic markers. This attack works in a setting in which the 
sensitive feature being inferred is drawn from a small set. 
Differential privacy is an often used as a solution for situations like 
this. Authors showed that differential privacy when used with 
appropriate privacy budgets can prevent their model inversion 
attacks but it may impact the clinical efficacy therefore putting 
patients to some risk. It is not known whether model inversion 
attacks propose in [18] work outside their settings. Fredrikson, Jha 
and Ristenpart extended their previous work to develop a new class 
of model inversion attack [19]. This new model inversion attack 
uses the confidence percentage provided with predictions. They 
tested their new attack on commercial ML-as-a-service APIs. The 
attack infers sensitive features used as inputs to decision tree 
models for lifestyle surveys, as well as to recover images from API 
access to facial recognition services. Figure 2 shows a recognizable 
image of a person produced by an attacker using new model 
inversion attack.  Only API access to a facial recognition system 
and the name of the person whose face is recognized by it were 
available to the attacker. In another experiment, they attacked a 
decision trees for lifestyle surveys and could estimate whether a 
respondent in the survey admitted to cheating on their significant 
other. The paper discusses some countermeasures to model 
inversion attack and show that systems can be secured against these 
kinds of attacks with negligible degradation to utility. 
 
Figure 2: An image recovered using a new model inversion 
attack (left) and the actual training set image (right). 
(Image Credit: Fredrikson et al [19]) 
3.2 Inferring useful information 
Even though the major machine learning algorithms are publicly 
known, the training data used to build a proprietary model may not 
be publically available and may be protected as trade secrets. Some 
machine learning classifiers can unconsciously revel the statistical 
information. Ateniese et al [20] showed that it is possible to infer 
unexpected but useful information from machine learning 
classifiers. They build a meta-classifier which is trained to hack 
other classifiers, obtaining meaningful information about their 
training sets. Using the methodology proposed, an adversary infers 
statistical properties from the relationship among dataset entries 
and not the attributes of the dataset. They experimented with a 
speech recognition classifier that uses Hidden Markov Models and 
extracted information such as the accent of the speakers that is not 
supposed to be captured explicitly by the model and which is not 
an attribute of the training set. In another case study, they showed 
that it is possible to determine whether a certain type of network 
traffic was included in the training set of an Internet traffic classifier 
trained on network data flow data. 
Another type of inference attack is membership inference attack. 
Given the black box access to a model (e.g., via public APIs) and a 
data record, an attacker may be interested in knowing whether that 
data record was part of the training set of the model. Shokri et al 
[21] used membership attacks on classification models trained by 
commercial "ML as a service" providers such as Google and 
Amazon. They trained their own inference model and then 
observed the differences in predictions by their own model and by 
the target model. They compared differences for the inputs that 
were used to train their own model versus the inputs that were not. 
Some realistic datasets and classification tasks such as a hospital 
discharge dataset were used for experiments. They demonstrated 
that these models are vulnerable to membership inference attacks. 
3.3 Model Extraction using Online APIs 
Machine learning as a service for applications such as predictive 
analytics are deployed with publicly accessible query interfaces 
(APIs). These models are deemed confidential due to their sensitive 
training data, commercial value, or other reasons such as use in 
security applications. Access is provided on a pay-per-query basis.  
In such situations, an adversary has black-box access but no prior 
knowledge of the machine learning model's parameters or training 
data. 
Tramer et al [2] presented simple attacks to extract target machine 
learning models for popular model classes such as logistic 
regression, neural networks, and decision trees. Model extraction 
attacks were demonstrated on popular online ML-as-a-service 
providers such as BigML and Amazon Machine Learning. Their 
attacks were complete black box and the adversary does not even 
need to know the model type or any distribution information about 
training data. They could build local models that are functionally 
very close to the target. In some experiments, their attacks extracted 
the exact parameters of the target (e.g., the coefficients of a linear 
classifier or the paths of a decision tree). In situations where the 
model type, parameters or features of the target were not known, 
they used an additional preliminary attack step to reverse-engineer 
these model characteristics. Machine learning prediction APIs of 
major online services such as Google, Amazon, Microsoft, and 
BigML all return precision confidence values along with class 
labels. Moreover, they work with partial queries lacking one or 
more features. These features can be exploited for model extraction 
attacks. The confidence value for logistic regression is a simple log-
linear function 1/(1+e−(w·x+β)) of the d-dimensional input vector x. 
Therefore, an attacker may solve w and β that define the model by 
querying d+1 random d-dimensional inputs for the unknown d+1 
parameters. Such equation-solving attacks extend to multiclass 
logistic regressions and neural networks, but do not work for 
decision trees. For decision trees, a confidence value implies the 
number of training data samples labeled correctly on an input’s path 
in the tree. However, these confidence values can still be used as 
pseudo-identifiers for paths in the tree therefore assisting in 
discovering tree’s structure. Omitting confidence values from 
outputs is an obvious countermeasure against these attacks. 
Authors proposed new attacks inspired by an agnostic learning 
algorithm [22]. Their new attacks extract models from more than 
99% of targets for a variety of model classes but need up to 100 
times more queries than equation-solving attacks. 
Papernot et al [23] introduced a practical black-box attack on 
remotely hosted deep neural networks (DNN) with no knowledge 
of either the model internals or their training data. An adversary 
observes output label given by the DNN to chosen inputs. They 
train a local model using inputs synthetically generated and labeled 
by the target DNN. The trained local model can be used for other 
attacks such as crafting adversarial examples for mounting evasion 
attacks on the target DNN. 
4. EVASION ATTACKS 
Evasion attacks are the most prevalent type of attack on a machine 
learning system. Malicious inputs are carefully crafted to evade 
detection which essentially means that input is modified to make 
the machine learning algorithm classify it as a safe one instead of 
malicious. 
4.1 Adversarial Examples 
Szegedy et al [1] found that deep neural networks (DNN) learn 
input-output mappings that are fairly discontinuous. One can cause 
a DNN to wrongly classify an image by applying a specifically 
crafted modification (found by maximizing the network’s 
prediction error) that is difficult to distinguish by a human viewer. 
The same change to the image can cause a different network, 
trained on a different subset of the dataset, to incorrectly classify 
the same image. This property of deep neural network can be 
exploited to create any number of adversarial inputs from the 
normal inputs. 
Practical Black-Box Attacks method proposed by Papernot et al 
[23] misclassified 84.24% of the crafted adversarial examples on 
MetaMind (an online deep learning API) DNN. They also used 
logistic regression substitutes to craft adversarial examples for 
Amazon and Google ML APIs and found misclassification rate of 
96.19% and 88.94% respectively. 
Papernot et al [24] show that adversarial attacks are also effective 
when targeting neural network policies in reinforcement learning. 
Adversaries capable of introducing small perturbations to the raw 
input can significantly degrade test-time performance. The strategy 
is to train a local substitute DNN using a synthesized data set. Input 
data is synthesized but the label assigned is what the target DNN 
assigns to it and observed by the adversary. Adversarial examples 
are generated by using the substitute parameters known to 
adversary. These are misclassified by both target DNN and the 
substitute DNN created locally because they both have the same 
decision boundaries. To create a small perturbation so that the 
changed image looks similar to the original one, an algorithm 
named fast gradient sign method [25]. The cost gradient is 
computed for pixels and the target pixels (areas) for perturbation is 
identified. Another algorithm by Papernot et al. [26] can cause a 
misclassification for samples from any legitimate source class to 
any chosen target class. That is, any image can be changed slightly 
such that it is classified to a desired class (say ostrich) by the DNN. 
Therefore, a school bus image can be changed in such a way that to 
humans, it still looks like a bus but the DNN recognizes it as an 
ostrich (for that matter any class chosen by the adversary). Input 
components are added to a perturbation in order of decreasing 
adversarial saliency value until the resulting  adversarial  sample is  
misclassified by the mode. 
Goodfellow et al [25] argue that the primary cause of neural 
networks' vulnerability to adversarial perturbation is their 
linearnature. The most intriguing fact about neural networks is their 
generalization across architectures and training sets. Using this 
view, they discussed a simple and fast method of generating 
adversarial examples. This approach can be used to generate 
examples for adversarial training to reduce the test set error. 
Papernot et al [26] introduced a class of algorithms to create 
adversarial inputs based on a precise understanding of the mapping 
between inputs and outputs of DNNs. They defined a hardness 
measure to evaluate the vulnerability of different sample classes to 
adversarial perturbations. They defined a predictive measure of 
distance between a benign input and a target classification to 
describe preliminary defenses against adversarial samples. 
Moosavi-Dezfooli et al [27] proposed the DeepFool algorithm to 
efficiently compute perturbations that fool deep networks thus 
quantifying the robustness of these classifiers. This computation of 
robustness can be used to make classifiers more robust. 
4.2 Generative Adversarial Networks (GANs) 
Goodfellow et al [28] introduced Generative adversarial networks. 
They are implemented by simultaneously training two models:  a 
generative model G that captures the data distribution, and a 
discriminative model D that estimates the probability that a sample 
came from the training data rather than G. The training procedure 
for G is to maximize the probability of D making a mistake. This 
can be viewed as a competition between a team of counterfeiters 
and a team of police. If generative model is assumed to be 
producing fake currency such that it can pass without detection, 
then the discriminative model is trying to detect the counterfeit 
currency.  Competition leads both teams to improve their methods 
until the counterfeits cannot be distinguished from the genuine 
currency. 
Kos et al [29] presented three classes of attacks on the VAE and 
VAE-GAN architectures [30]. The first attack leverages 
classification-based adversaries by attaching a classifier to the 
trained encoder of the target generative model. The second attack 
directly uses the VAE loss function to generate a target 
reconstruction image from the adversarial example. And the third 
attack directly optimizes against differences in source and target 
latent representations. 
4.3 Query Strategies for Evasion 
An adversary systematically creates queries for a classifier to elicit 
information that allows the attacker to evade detection.  Nelson el 
al [31] present query algorithms to construct undetected instances 
for convex-inducing classifiers. Only polynomially-many queries 
in the dimension of the space and in the level of approximation are 
required with approximately minimal cost. The family of convex-
inducing classifiers partition their feature space into two sets, one 
of which is convex. This family is a super set of the family of linear 
classifiers. They demonstrated that near optimal evasion can be 
achieved for convex-inducing classifiers without a need to know 
the classifier's decision boundary. 
4.4 Adversarial Classification 
In traditional classification, an input is classified as one of classes. 
In an adversarial setting, an adversary can manipulate input 
instances to avoid being so classified. Learning to distinguish good 
inputs from malicious ones is known as adversarial classification. 
Vorobeychik and Li [32] presented a general theoretical analysis of 
the problem of adversarial classification. They generalized 
adversarial classifier reverse engineering (ACRE) process to 
demonstrate that if a classifier can be efficiently learned, it can also 
be efficiently reverse engineered. This result is extended to 
randomized classification schemes showing that effectiveness of 
reverse engineering depends on the defender's randomization 
scheme. They characterized optimal randomization schemes in 
presence of adversarial reverse engineering and classifier 
manipulation. They observed that the defender's optimal policy 
tends to be either to randomize uniformly (ignoring baseline 
classification accuracy) or not to randomize at all (i.e, targeted 
attacks or indiscriminate attacks). 
Adversaries are not static data generators, but make a deliberate 
effort to evade the classifiers deployed to detect them. Li and 
Vorobeychik [33] studied the problems of modeling the objectives 
of such adversaries and the algorithmic problem of accounting for 
rational, objective-driven adversaries. 
4.5 Evasion Attacks on Text Based Systems 
Perturbation techniques for image or audio based system cannot 
directly work on text based systems. That is because an important 
requirement of the perturbation used is to change the image or audio 
such that it still looks good to a human observer/listener. Whereas 
in a text, changing words by adding/deleting characters or changing 
sentences by adding/deleting words may make the sentence/word 
meaningless or change its meaning significantly and therefore 
cannot remain unnoticed by a human reader. Therefore, a 
perturbation technique must change the text such that it still looks 
good/suspicious to a human observer but machine learning system 
fails to classify it correctly after perturbation. For example, a spam 
email carrying an advertisement should still carry the advertisement 
message but fool the spam filtering system in classifying it as a 
regular email. 
Creating adversarial inputs for text classification systems seems to 
be a harder problem than doing the same for the image or audio 
classification. Some recent work has shown that it is possible to 
systematically create such adversarial inputs. Liang et al [45] 
discuss the problem of creating perturbation. They propose three 
techniques named insertion, modification, and removal, to generate 
adversarial samples for given text. They compute cost gradients 
(originally proposed in [25] for images and proven to be effective 
in [26] and [27]) to decide what and where should be inserted, what 
and how to modify and what should be removed from a text sample. 
However, using the fast gradient sign method (FGSM) of [25] 
directly makes the text unreadable. Using cost gradient, they 
identify the text items that possess significant contribution to the 
classification. Then instead of changing the characters arbitrarily, 
they use one or more of insertion, modification and removal to craft 
an adversarial sample for a given text. 
They demonstrate using experiments that standard text 
classification systems can be deceived into misclassifying input 
text samples as any desirable classes by using their perturbation 
techniques without compromising the utility of the input text. They 
also show that deep neural network based text classifiers are also 
prone to such attacks. They have shown that by adding just one 
word at a specific place in a paragraph, or by misspelling just one 
instance of a word in a paragraph, the system can be fooled in 
classifying a text paragraph incorrectly with very high confidence. 
For example, a paragraph describing 1939 film Maisie is correctly 
classified by the system as about films with 99.6% confidence. 
They slightly misspelled a word ("film" to "flim") at a particular 
place in the paragraph and the system classifies the modified 
paragraph as about companies even though the paragraph still 
contains other correctly spelled instances of the world “film”. 
4.6 Evaluating Classifiers Security Against 
Evasion Attacks 
Adversarial scenario is often not considered at design time. A 
framework to evaluate potential performance degradation under 
potential attacks is proposed by Biggio et al [34]. The proposed 
framework evaluates classifier security empirically. It formalizes 
and generalizes the main ideas proposed in pattern classification 
theory and design methods. This framework is used to build a 
gradient-based approach [35] to assess the security of widely-used 
classification algorithms against evasion attacks. This provides the 
designer a better picture of the classifier performance under 
potential evasion attacks. The designer therefore can perform a 
more informed model selection (or parameter setting). 
5. POISONING ATTACKS 
In poisoning attacks, attackers try to influence training data to 
influence the learning outcome. The purpose of poisoning attacks 
may vary from affecting the performance of learning algorithm to 
deliberately introducing specific biases in the model. In many 
applications, training is not a one-time job and model is often 
retrained to accommodate for the change in data distribution. In 
some situation, data collection is crowdsourced and many users 
provide data sample that are used to continuously train the model. 
Some domains such as network intrusion detection, spam filtering, 
malware detection etc. are highly suspect of poisoning attacks but 
any machine learning system can be a victim of poisoning attacks. 
5.1 Network Intrusion Detection 
For intrusion detection, statistical machine learning based 
techniques build a model for normal behavior from training data 
and then detect attacks that deviates from that model. Adversaries 
try to manipulate the training data so that the learned model treats 
intrusion also as normal network behavior. 
Rubinstein et al [36] show how attackers can substantially increase 
their chance of successfully evading detection by only adding 
moderate amounts of poisoned data. Such poisoning disturbs the 
balance between false positives and false negatives resulting in 
dramatically reduced effectiveness of the system. They proposed a 
robust PCA-based detector called ‘antidote’. It is based on 
techniques from robust statistics. They show that poisoning has 
little effect on the robust model. 
Kloft and Laskov [37] analyzed the performance of online centroid 
anomaly detection in an adversarial setup. They derived bounds on 
the effectiveness of a poisoning attack against centroid anomaly 
detection under different conditions. While poisoning attacks can 
be successful in the unconstrained case, they become arbitrarily 
difficult if external constraints are properly used. They used real 
traces of HTTP and exploit traffic and confirmed the tightness of 
proposed theoretical bounds. 
5.2 Poisoning Support Vector Machines 
Xiao and Eckert [38] address the problem of label flips attack. In 
this attack, an adversary poisons the training set by flipping labels. 
An optimization framework is formulated to finds label flips that 
maximize the classification error. They proposed an algorithm for 
attacking support vector machines (SVMs). 
Biggio et al [39] discuss a family of poisoning attacks against 
Support Vector Machines (SVM). These attacks introduce 
specially crafted training data to increases SVM's test error. 
Learning algorithms often assume that training data comes from a 
well-behaved distribution which is not true in an adversarial setting. 
They demonstrated that an intelligent adversary can predict the 
change of the SVM's decision function to some extent by using 
malicious input. The adversary then uses this ability to craft 
malicious samples. Proposed attack uses a gradient ascent strategy 
where the gradient is computed based on properties of the SVM's 
optimal solution. The aim of such attacks is to increase classifier’s 
error rate. 
5.3 Factorization-Based Collaborative 
Filtering 
Li et al [40] introduced a data poisoning attack on collaborative 
filtering systems. They demonstrated how a powerful attacker with 
full knowledge of the learner can generate malicious data to 
maximize his objectives while mimicking normal user behavior to 
avoid detection. The assumption about complete knowledge is 
extreme but it enables a robust assessment of the vulnerability of 
collaborative filtering schemes to highly motivated attacks. 
Authors considered two popular factorization-based collaborative 
filtering algorithms - the alternative minimization formulation and 
the nuclear norm minimization method. 
5.4 Defensive Distillation 
Papernot at al [41] introduced a defensive mechanism called 
defensive distillation that reduces the effectiveness of adversarial 
samples on deep neural networks (DNNs). Distillation is a training 
procedure that was designed to train a DNN using knowledge 
transferred from a different DNN [46][47]. The motivation behind 
the knowledge transfer is to reduce the computational complexity 
of DNN architectures by transferring knowledge from larger 
architectures to smaller ones. This facilitates the deployment of 
deep learning in resource constrained devices that cannot rely on 
powerful GPUs to perform computations. A new variant of 
distillation is proposed for defense training. Instead of transferring 
knowledge between different architectures, knowledge extracted 
from a DNN is used to improve its own resilience to adversarial 
samples. An analytical investigation is presented for the 
generalizability and robustness properties granted by defensive 
distillation when training DNNs. Two DNNs were placed in 
adversarial settings to empirically study the effectiveness of 
defensive distillation. They show that defensive distillation can 
reduce effectiveness of sample creation from 95% to less than 0.5% 
on the DNNs used in their study. This can be explained by the fact 
that distillation reduces by a factor of 1030 the gradients used in 
adversarial sample creation. Distillation also increases by 800% the 
average minimum number of features required to be modified for 
creating adversarial samples on one of the DNNs used in their 
experiments. 
5.5 Semi-Supervised Text Classification 
Adversarial training is used for regularizing supervised learning 
algorithms and virtual adversarial training extends supervised 
learning algorithms to the semi-supervised setting. Both methods 
require making small perturbations to several entries of the input 
vector. This is inappropriate for sparse high-dimensional inputs 
such as one-hot word representations.  Miyato et al [42] extend 
adversarial and virtual adversarial training to the text domain. by 
Perturbations is applied to the word embeddings in a recurrent 
neural network and not to the original input. This method achieves 
good results on multiple benchmark for semi-supervised and 
supervised tasks. Analysis shows that the learned word embeddings 
improved in quality and that the model is less prone to overfitting 
while training. 
 
 
 
6. SUMMARY 
Early Work 
Applications: Spam filters, anti-virus/ malware, network 
intrusion detection, biometric verification and authentication 
Approaches: 
Game-theory based approaches – game between classifier and 
adversary. optimal classifier to automatically adjusts to 
adversary's evolving inputs; find the equilibrial prediction 
models 
Signature-based intrusion detection systems - polymorphic 
techniques to generate attack instances that do not share fixed 
signatures - attackers can use polymorphic techniques to make 
attack instances look different from each other. 
Polymorphic blending attacks - can evade byte-frequency based 
network anomaly intrusion detection systems by matching the 
statistics of mutated attack samples with normal samples. 
Making classifiers robust - not assign too much weight to a 
single feature; game theoretic formalization to avoid over 
weighting single feature. 
Multimodal biometric systems - likelihood ratio based fusion 
scheme and fuzzy logic based fusion scheme 
Attacks: exploratory, evasion and poisoning 
Exploratory attacks: 
Model Inversion: black box access to model and some 
demographic information about a person, an attacker can predict 
private information such as genetic markers from a healthcare 
system. 
Inferring information: an adversary can infer statistical 
properties from the relationship among dataset entries 
Membership inference attack: given the black box access to 
model and a data sample, it can be inferred whether that data 
record was part of the training set or not. 
Model Extraction using Online APIs: local models can be built 
that function very similar to proprietary models for which only 
API access is available. Confidence score and partial values for 
API are used to find key coefficients of the model. 
Evasion attacks: 
Adversarial Examples: systematic adversarial perturbation; 
DeepFool algorithm to efficiently compute perturbations that 
fool deep networks 
Generative Adversarial Networks (GANs): simultaneously 
training two models:  a generative model G that captures the data 
distribution, and a discriminative model D that estimates the 
probability that a sample came from the training data rather than 
G. 
Adversarial classification: Learning to distinguish good inputs 
from malicious ones is known as adversarial classification. 
Useful in adversarial training. 
Text-based systems: text classification systems can be fooled by 
carefully inserting, modifying or removing some text such that 
the meaning of text does not change for a human user. 
Poisoning attacks: 
Network Intrusion Detection: input samples to disturb the 
balance between false positives and false negatives therefore 
reducing effectiveness. 
Support Vector Machine Poisoning: label flips attack; adversary 
can predict the change of the SVM's decision function to some 
extent by using malicious input. This can be used to craft 
malicious samples. 
Defensive Distillation: Distillation is a training procedure that 
was designed to train a DNN using knowledge transferred from 
a different DNN. This technique is used for defense training. 
 
7. EMERGING RESEARCH DIRECTIONS 
Generating adversarial examples to fool machine learning 
algorithms in making incorrect classification and making machine 
learning systems robust against these inputs are active research 
areas. But it is fundamentally hard problem to defend against 
adversarial examples because it is hard to build a theoretical model 
for crafting adversarial inputs. Adversarial inputs are solutions to 
an optimization problem that is non-linear and non-convex for 
many machine learning models, including neural networks. Since 
good theoretical tools for describing the solutions to these 
optimization problems do not exist, it is very hard to put forward a 
theoretical argument that a defense strategy would rule out a set of 
adversarial inputs. Like other computer security areas such as 
computer viruses/malwares, a defense technique makes a system 
robust against one type of attack. When a new vulnerability is 
discovered by an attacker, a new defense is required to build for 
that attack. Designing an adaptive defense against an adaptive 
attacker is an important research area. 
Using defensive distillation to guard a system against adversarial 
examples is an interesting research direction. A neural network is 
used to label images with probability vectors instead of single 
labels.  A new neural network is then trained using the probability 
vector labels. This makes the second neural network less prone to 
over-fitting. Papernot and his fellow researchers have shown that to 
fool such networks, eight times more distortion to the image is 
needed compared to what is needed without distillation. There 
seems to be scope further improve defensive distillation methods to 
make networks more robust. 
Building benchmarks to measure a machine learning model’s 
performance performs against an adversary is another open 
problem. Ideally, there should be standard set of benchmarks for 
measuring accuracy of an ML algorithm and there should be 
standard benchmarks for measuring its performance in adversarial 
settings. 
If we see the history of software development, security was added 
to software products at a very late stage, often after a functional 
product is built and tested for its functional and performance related 
requirements. Only recently, security became an important 
consideration at requirement analysis and design stage. Machine 
learning systems can be considered in their early days where 
security is considered only after the system is attacked or some 
vulnerability is discovered. Security in machine learning systems 
should be built from the start and not as an afterthought. Some 
research is due on evolving software engineering methodology for 
building machine learning system. 
Another emerging research area in adversarial ML domain is of 
Generative Adversarial Networks. Theoretically, generative model 
and discriminative model in a GAN should be best at the Nash 
equilibrium. But a gradient descent is guaranteed to get to the Nash 
equilibrium only in the convex case. And for other ML models, it 
is not even possible to reach equilibrium. If players are represented 
by neural networks then they can keep adapting forever and would 
never converge therefore never reaching the equilibrium. Fixing the 
non-convergence problem in GANs is an open problem as of now. 
Finally, some fundamental work is due to change the learning 
process of machines. Quoting a story from Dave Gershgorn’s 
article in Popular Science [44]: 
In the early 1900s, Wilhelm von Osten, a German horse 
trainer and mathematician, told the world that his horse could 
do math. He would ask his horse, Clever Hans, to compute 
simple equations. In response, Hans would tap his hoof for the 
correct answer. Two plus two? Four taps. 
Psychologist Carl Stumpf found that Clever Hans wasn’t 
solving equations, but responding to visual cues. Hans would 
tap up to the correct number, which was usually when his 
trainer and the crowd broke out in cheers. And then he would 
stop. When he couldn’t see those expressions, he kept tapping 
and tapping. 
A lot of today’s machine learning and artificial intelligence work 
like Hans. We know how to build systems that can learn enough to 
give correct answers but without really understanding the 
information.  That makes them easy to deceive. It is like guessing 
and constructing a digital circuit with n inputs by looking at k 
random items in its truth table where k<<2n. 
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Appendix-A: Open Source Software/Libraries 
cleverhans 
Named after the early 20th century house Clver Hans who his trainer claimed could do math, cleverhans is a software library for benchmarking 
vulnerability to adversarial examples. The library is maintained by Ian Goodfellow and Nicolas Papernot, two leading researchers in 
adversarial machine learning. 
Repository URL: https://github.com/openai/cleverhans 
This repository contains the source code for cleverhans, a Python library to benchmark machine learning systems' vulnerability to adversarial 
examples. 
 
textfool 
Plausible looking adversarial examples for text classification. It provides a function that "paraphrases" a text by replacing some words with 
their WordNet synonyms, sorting by GloVe similarity between the synonym and the original context window. Relies on SpaCy and NLTK. 
Repository URL: https://github.com/bogdan-kulynych/textfool 
 
AdversariaLib and ALFASVMLib 
AdversariaLib is an open-source python library for the security evaluation of machine learning (ML)-based classifiers under adversarial 
attacks. 
ALFASVMLib is an open-source Matlab library that implements a set of heuristic attacks against Support Vector Machines (SVMs). The 
goal of such attacks is to maximally compromise the SVM's classification accuracy by mislabeling a given fraction of training samples. They 
are indeed referred to as adversarial label flip attacks 
These libraries are maintied by PRA Lab, University of Cagliari, Italy. 
URLs: http://pralab.diee.unica.it/en/AdversariaLib and http://pralab.diee.unica.it/en/ALFASVMLib 
 
deep-pwning: Metasploit for machine learning 
Deep-pwning is a lightweight framework for experimenting with machine learning models with the goal of evaluating their robustness against 
a motivated adversary. This framework is built on top of Tensorflow.  
URL: https://github.com/cchio/deep-pwning 
 
